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The Corporation, New Governance, and the
Power of the Publicization Narrative
FENNER L. STEWART*
ABSTRACT

'The Corporation, New Governance, and the Power of the
PublicizationNarrative"takes a critical look at the idea of publicization
and how it plays out within new governance. Publicization is a vague,
but powerful, notion that the delegation of public power to for-profit
agents-what John Braithwaite calls the 'privatization of the public" will lead to such agents exercising this power as idealized public
servants-what Braithwaite calls the 'oublicization of the private." This
article argues that publicization of the private is a dangerous metaphor,
which offers a romanticized picture of functionally efficient, decentered
actors acting with the integrity of public servants. This article suggests
that "publicizationof the private" is an empty promise that will lead the
faithful to be less critical of privatization. Accordingly, this article
suggests that new governance initiatives may be leading to the
privatizationof the public without the publicizationof the private.
INTRODUCTION

In Regulatory Capitalism: How it Works, Ideas for Making it Work
Better, John Braithwaite wrote an eye-catching phrase: regulatory
capitalism represents the "reality of hybridity between the privatization
of the public and publicization of the private."' The privatization of the

* Fenner Stewart is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Calgary
Faculty of Law. He is a member of the University of Calgary's Energy Research Strategy,
entitled "Energy Innovation for Today and Tomorrow." This confederation of scholars is a
new inter-faculty cluster from the Faculty of Arts, the Schulich School of Engineering, the
Haskayne School of Business, and the Faculty of Law. The scholastic assembly's goal is to
help the University become a world leader in energy research. Professor Stewart is also a
Director of the Midwest Center for Energy Law and Policy.
1. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, REGULATORY CAPITALISM: How IT WORKS, IDEAS FOR MAKING
IT WORK BETTER 8 (2008).
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public had been well documented, 2 but the idea of publicization of the
private appeared to hold new promise. 3 I had spotted Braithwaite's new
optimism earlier in a 2006 working paper, when he admitted that he
had been concerned about the neoliberal shift toward privatization, 4
even though he had been endorsing the self-governance of private actors
for some time.5 But now (as of 2006), he was convinced that his fears
regarding neoliberalism were excessive, and that it was merely a stage
of "regulatory capitalism."6
In April of 2013, Braithwaite released a new working paper that
further extrapolates on publicization, explaining that it means "the
percolation of public law values into private law and into corporate selfregulation [, including] the most critical public law values such as
transparency, accountability, stakeholder voice and separations of
powers."7 Jody Freeman, the originator of this idea, described
publicization as a process by which "private actors increasingly commit
themselves to traditionally public goals as the price of access to
lucrative opportunities .

.

. that might otherwise be provided directly by

the state."8
However, in the decade since Freeman hypothesized that this
publicization would occur, there has been little evidence of such a
transformation. 9 For better or worse, business actors do not appear to be
any more or less imbued with the spirit of public service than in the
past, leaving questions as to whether recent regulatory experimentation
2. See, e.g., DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE
BATTLE FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY (rev. ed. 2002).
3. For the origins of the concept, see Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms
Through Privatization,116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1285 (2003).

4. See generally John Braithwaite, Neoliberalism or Regulatory Capitalism (Austl.
Nat'l Univ. Regulatory Insts. Network, Occasional Paper No. 5, 2005), available at
https://www.anu.edu.aulfellows/jbraithwaite/_documents/Articles/NeoliberalismRegulato
ry_2005.pdf.
5. See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992).
6. Braithwaite, supra note 4, at 8, 18. Regulatory Capitalism is a theory that suggests
the global political economy is evermore reliant on administrative rules even though such
rules many not emanate from traditional sources like national legislatures and courts. It
rejects the central argument of deregulation that there is a decline in regulation,
providing much empirical evidence to the fact that there is a profound expansion of
regulation. See generally David Levi-Faur & Jacint Jordana, The Rise of Regulatory
Capitalism:The Global Diffusion of a New Order, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCl.
6 (2005).

7. John Braithwaite, Strategic Socialism, Strategic Privatizationand Crisis 4 (Austl.
Nat'l Univ. Regulatory Insts. Network, Working Paper No. 2013/11, 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2249544.
8. Freeman, supra note 3, at 1285.
9. See, e.g., Braithwaite, supra note 7, at 5.
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has come at the expense of the long-term integrity of governance.10 Both
the collapse of Enron and the credit crisis have been, in large part,
attributable to the regulatory failures caused by the decisions of forprofit "gatekeepers,"11 such as Arthur Andersen 1 2 and Standard &
Poor's.13 These "gatekeepers" were enjoying the sort of lucrative
opportunities that Freeman had envisioned but failed to adequately
publicize as she predicted.
In light of the continued interest in the idea of publicization, this
article offers some considerations that might be taken into account
when attempting to evaluate its potential. To do so, this article, in part,
takes a second look at the literatures supporting "new governance"
initiatives that expose the publicization of the private. New governance
is an umbrella term for theories of governance that encourage
regulatory architects to marry the best of both the public and private
orderings.1 4 It celebrates a "blurring" of public and private functions
within areas of regulation.' 5

10. See generally Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Private Regulatory Governance:
Ambiguities of PublicAuthority and PrivatePower (Osgoode Hall Law Sch. Comp. Res. in
Law
& Pol.
Econ.,
Working
Paper No.
22/2013,
2013),
available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2252208.
11. JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 1-6 (2006).
12. See, e.g., Kristen Hays, Enron at Eye Level: A Reporter's View of the Trials, in
ENRON AND OTHER CORPORATE FIAscos: THE CORPORATE SCANDAL READER 3 (Nancy B.
Rapoport et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009); Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur
Andersen Different? An EmpiricalExamination of Major Accounting FirmAudits of Large
Clients, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STuD. 263 (2004) (concluding that after controlling for
client size, region, time, and industry, there was no evidence that Andersen's performance
significantly differed from other large accounting firms).
13. See John C. Coffee Jr., What Went Wrong? An Initial Inquiry into the Causes of the
2008 Financial Crisis, 9 J. CORP. L. STuD. 1, 10-13 (2009), for how investment banks
exploit new governance regulations to more than double the maximum leverage (15:1)
allowable
under
regulatory
requirements.
Frank
Partnoy
argues
that
credit rating agencies have "little incentive to 'get it right,"' which "pose[s] a systemic
risk." Frank Partnoy, Rethinking Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies: An Institutional
Investor Perspective 3 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law, Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 09-014, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1430608. Timothy
Sinclair identifies that the issue is conventionally conceived as that the way that credit
rating agencies are remunerated generates a conflict of interest. He suggests that this
conflict of interest is overblown and that focus should be on the challenges rating agencies
(and similar gatekeepers) face, more generally, in a market system. See Timothy J.
Sinclair, Credit Rating Agencies and the Global FinancialCrisis, EcoN. Soc., Nov. 2010,
at 4, 4.
14. See generally Lisa T. Alexander, Reflections on Success and Failure in New
Governance and the Role of the Lawyer, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 737; William H. Simon, New
Governance Anxieties: A Deweyan Response, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 727; David Trubek &

516

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 21:2

The publicization dimension of new governance rhetoric invokes an
out of focus image of the democratic delegation of power to for-profit
agents, who, it is assumed, will exercise this power in a benevolent and
efficient manner. For many regulatory scholars, with market failure to
their left and regulatory failure to their right, publicization of the
private represents a best-case metaphor whereby governance enjoys the
optimal balance between the functional efficiencies of decentered
actors16 and the integrity of idealized public servants. But again, this
vision of publicization is out of focus and lacking in detail. This may be a
serious problem if it creates a false promise of a panacea for the social
ills attributed to privatization-such as the "democratic deficit" it
creates. 17
This article invites scholars to reconsider whether such blurring of
public and private functions should be encouraged, and argues that the
publicization of for-profit activities is a goal that is unlikely to be
achieved. In light of Freeman's "ideal" of publicization, this article
suggests that the best-case scenario for new governance may be merely
the privatization of the public without the publicization of the private.
And if this is the case then new governance, and its call for a further
blurring of public and private functions, merits a critical re-evaluation.
Part I of this article provides an introduction to some of the
literatures that inform new governance. Part II explores the normative
strength of corporate governance to resist publicization. Part III looks at
the challenges that technocratic narratives pose to publicization within
both public and private governance. This article concludes by suggesting
that, based on the arguments presented, for-profit actors will not
publicize as the literature suggests. This conclusion invites further
discussion as to the possibility of a more directed process that engineers
a reconstitution of the public and private in light of the challenges
facing modern governance, rather than just leaving it to the fortunes of
market-driven "spontaneous evolution."

Louise Trubek, The World Turned Upside Down: Reflections on New Governance and the
Transformation of Law, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 719.
15. See generally Jason M. Solomon, New Governance, Preemptive Self-Regulation, and
the Blurringof Boundaries in Regulatory Theory and Practice,2010 Wis. L. REV. 591.
16. See, e.g., Julia Black, CriticalReflections on Regulation, 27 AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 1
(2002). See also F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. EcoN. REV. 519
(1945).
17. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Law, Markets and Democracy: A Role for Law in the NeoLiberal State, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 801, 810-11 (2007). Of course, the concerns over the
"democratic deficit" exist beyond privatization issues and are considered by those who are
concerned about the entire project of new governance. See, e.g., GOVERNANCE AND THE
DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT 307-11 (Victor Bekkers et al. eds., 2007).
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I. THE FOUNDATION FOR NEW GOVERNANCE

It is yet to be determined how new governance18 will play out.19
Thus, its merits are difficult to assess. The literature-if it is a single
literature-is fragmented: collaborative, 20 incentive-based, 21 reflexive, 22
responsive, 23 and decentered 24 notions of governance are not necessarily
mindful of each other and appear not to be moving toward a single
cohesive position. Attempts to synthesize the new governance
18. See Orly Lobel, New Governance as Regulatory Governance, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 65, 65 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012), for a definition of new
governance. "[N]ew governance has emerged as a school of thought that focuses on the
significance of institutional design and culture for effective and legitimate regulation. The
development of new governance theory marks a paradigm shift from the old regulation by
command and control to a regulatory governance model, signifying a collective intellectual
and programmatic project for a new legal regime. New governance offers a vision of law
and policy that draws on the comparative strengths of both private and public
stakeholders and highlights the multiple ways in which the various actors in a society
contribute to the acts of ordering social fields. New governance scholars begin with an
analysis of both markets and governance failures to challenge the conventional wisdom
that regulation must involve top-down command-and-control rules. Instead they attempt
to offer a third-way vision between unregulated markets and top-down government
controls."
19. For a reflection on the present transformation, see, for example, Lisa Blomgren
Bingham, The Next Generation of Administrative Law: Building the Legal Infrastructure
for Collaborative Governance, 2010 WIs. L. REV. 297; Mark Dawson, Transforming into
What? New Governance in the EU and the "ManagerialSensibility" in Modern Law, 2010
WIs. L. REV. 389; Poul F. Kjaer, The Metamorphosis of the Functional Synthesis: A
Continental European Perspective on Governance, Law, and the Political in the
TransnationalSpace, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 489; Trubek & Trubek, supra note 14.
20. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997); Philip J. Harter, Collaboration:The Futureof Governance, 2009 J.
DIsp. RESOL. 411 (2009).
21. See, e.g., Lily N. Chinn, Can the Market Be Fairand Efficient? An Environmental
Justice Critique of Emissions Trading, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 80, 80-88, 102-25 (1999); Daniel
H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When is Command-and-Control Efficient? Institutions,
Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for
Environmental Protection, 1999 WIs. L. REV. 887, 887-94, 935-38; Richard B. Stewart, A
New Generationof EnvironmentalRegulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 94-127 (2001).
22. See, e.g., ULRICH BECK, RISIKOGESELLSCHAFT: AUF DEM WEG IN EINE ANDERE
MODERNE (1986) (Ger.), translated in RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY (1992);
Ulrich Beck et al., The Theory of Reflexive Modernization: Problematic, Hypotheses and
Research Programme,20 THEORY CULTURE & SOC'Y 1 (2003); Peer Zumbansen, Law After
the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism,and the Ironic Turn of Reflexive Law, 56 AM.
J. CoMp. L. 769 (2008).
23. See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 5; BRAITHWAITE, supra note 1; David
Levi-Faur, The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 12 (2005).
24. See, e.g., Julia Black, DecentringRegulation: Understandingthe Role of Regulation
and Self-Regulation in a 'Post-Regulatory'World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 103 (2001).
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literature 25 have been charged with being "overzealouS" 26 because these
attempts invite a level of generalization that threatens to ignore
important differences between the literatures. In this way, new
governance is like critical legal theory 27-and legal realism for that
matter 28-in the sense that, although a number of authors can be
identified as being under the conceptual umbrella, the nature of the
movement as a whole defies an all-inclusive definition. 29
That being said, it is safe to assert that new governance is the study
of the ways in which governments release their authority to regulate, or
within
regulated
spaces,30
allowing
to enforce
regulation,
nongovernment organizations to share in providing administrative
functions traditionally associated with government. 31 New governance
may have replaced the command-and-control model of the welfare state.
If so, it may replace the welfare state as the ideological 32 binary pole to
a pure free market,3 3 within the spectrum of "models of capitalism." 34
25. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004).
26. Bradley C. Karkkainen, "New Governance" in Legal Thought and in the World:
Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471 (2004).
27. For a discussion of the nature of the movement and its fragmentation, see
generally Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to its Origins and
Underpinnings,36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505 (1986).
28. Joseph Singer discusses the competing notion of legal realism and the idea that
"[w]e are all legal realists now." Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L.
REV. 465, 467 (1988) (book review).
29. See, e.g., id.; Tushnet, supranote 27.
30. A prime example of this is regulatory capitalism. See generally BRAITHWAITE, supra
note 1. Although this does not bring additional clarity to the distinction between the
sphere of new commerce and the locus of new governance, it is significant to note the
distinctions that Braithwaite makes between understandings of neoliberalism,
privatization, and regulatory capitalism. See Braithwaite, supra note 4.
31. See Colin Scott, Private Regulation of the Public Sector: A Neglected Facet of
Contemporary Governance, 29 J.L. & SoC'Y 56, 57-60 (2002).
32. Cukierman emphasizes the importance of ideology, among other forms of
rationality, for its influence on economic policies, and thus the impact that ideology, for
better or worse, has on macroeconomic developments. See Alex Cukierman, The Roles of
Ideology, Institutions, Politics, and Economic Knowledge in Forecasting Macroeconomic
Developments: Lessons from the Crisis, 56 CESIFo EcON. STUD. 575, 575-79 (2010). Thus,
to reject ideology, when your opponents use it effectively as a tool for policy, is a
disadvantage, pragmatically speaking, if the end goal is to influence policy development.
33. Yergin and Stanislaw tell a story of the ideological tension of the 20th Century as
being between F.A. Hayek's free market ideology and J.M. Keynes's central planning. See
generally YERGIN & STANISLAW, supra note 2. See also Kari Polanyi-Levitt & Marguerite
Mendell, Karl Polanyi: His Life and Times, 22 STUD. POL. EcON. 7, 11 (1987).
34. See generally Colin Crouch, Models of Capitalism, 10 NEw POL. ECON. 439 (2005)
(outlining the boundaries of models of capitalism). See also Richard Deeg & Gregory
Jackson, Towards a More Dynamic Theory of Capitalist Variety, 5 SOclo-ECON. REV. 149
(2007) (arguing for more dynamism in comparative capitalisms literature).
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Accordingly, new governance may become the newest champion of
"embedded liberalism."3 5
New governance literature today appears hopeful of the "reassertion
of the public interest" within governance.3 6 Instead of framing the issue
just3 7 within the context of the "turn to the market,"38 the "withdrawal
of the welfare state,"39 or the "welfare state retrenchment," 40 new
governance provides a place to imagine the reconstituting, 41
restructuring, 42 reasserting,43 or the rise44 of the public dimension of
governance function. This appears to be the essential promise of new
governance: to provide an alternative that is not antibusiness, 45 yet still
attempt to balance the demands of markets with the interests of society
in a way that generates both sustainable and balanced policy options
and a governance mechanism that stabilizes wealth creation, protects
human dignity, and ensures a habitable natural environment for future
35. See John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change:
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT'L ORG. 379, 392 (1982),
coining the term "embedded liberalism." However, Ruggie was inspired to coin the term
because of Karl Polanyi's work on "embedded" and "disembedded" economic orders. See
KARL PoLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF
OUR TIME, at xxii-xxv (2d ed. 2001).
36. See, e.g., David Levi-Faur, Regulatory Capitalism and the Reassertion of the Public
Interest, 27 POL'Y & SOC'Y 181 (2009).
37. Of course, this is not to take away from the important "turn to the market,"
"withdrawal of the welfare state," or "welfare state retrenchment" debates. It is only to say
that different debates ought to also continue to emerge. Furthermore, the distinction
drawn here is a precarious one in the sense that many of the authors of the privatization
literature will also have a voice in these other literatures. Braithwaite, in particular, is
drawing a similar distinction when he distinguishes between neoliberalism and regulatory
capitalism. See generally Braithwaite, supra note 4. But such distinctions are not
embraced by many and are to some degree artificial. However, it has been drawn
presently in order to see what follows.
38. Bob Jessop, Governance Failure, in THE NEW POLITICS OF BRITISH LOCAL
GOVERNANCE 11, 11 (Gerry Stoker ed., 2000).
39. VITO TANzI, GOVERNMENT VERSUS MARKETS: THE CHANGING ECONOMIC ROLE OF
THE STATE 273 (2011).
40. See, e.g., Nathalie Giger & Moira Nelson, The Electoral Consequences of Welfare
State Retrenchment: Blame Avoidance or Credit Claiming in the Era of Permanent
Austerity?, 50 EUR. J. POL. RES. 1 (2010); Judith Treas, Can Families Compensate for
Welfare State Retrenchment?, 41 CONTEMP. Soc. 33 (2012).
41. See, e.g., Suzanne Mettler, Reconstituting the Submerged State: The Challenges of
Social Policy Reform in the Obama Era, 8 PERSP. POL. 803 (2010); BRAITHWAITE, supra
note 1; Black, supra note 24; Levi-Faur & Jordana, supra note 6.
42. See Lobel, supranote 25, at 363.
43. See Levi-Faur, supra note 36.
44. Colin Scott, Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-Regulatory
State, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 145, 148-49 (Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur
eds., 2004).
45. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 1, at vii-x.
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generations. As a result, new governance's boundaries, like those of
corporate governance, are assumed to be "blurred and porous," 46 as well
as in a state of disequilibrium, 47 which allows for a high level of
pragmatic "experimentalism"4 8 within new governance's learning
processes. 49 All of this points to the hopefulness of publicizationhopefulness this article wishes to temper.
Below, this article introduces a number of literatures on governance,
which help to construct a greater appreciation of some of the thoughts
that have influenced the form new governance appears to be taking. As
Orly Lobel suggests, new governance accepts "both market and
governance failures" and challenges "conventional wisdom," finding "a
third-way vision between unregulated markets and top-down
government controls."5 0 In particular, it challenges the notion that
governments have removed regulations from areas of society, and have
allowed markets to operate "freely."5 1 This notion of deregulation has
46. John R. Boatright, The Implications of the New Governance for Corporate
Governance, in CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AND NEW GOVERNANCE 133, 141 (Ingo Pies &
Peter Koslowski eds., 2011). Ball and Junemann discusses how governance, by its nature,
deconstructs or transcends organizational boundaries and not how these networks are
changes alluding to the understanding of regulated spaces that a governmentality
approach might offer, creating "overlap and confusion." See STEPHEN J. BALL & CAROLINA
JUNEMANN, NETWORKS, NEW GOVERNANCE AND EDUCATION 1-7 (2012).

47. Dewey believed that learning occurred by facing an experience of disequilibrium
and then finding a "more extensive balance," arguing "[e]quilibrium comes ... out of, and
because of, tension." JOHN DEWEY, ART As EXPERIENCE 14 (1934). In this sense, life and
learning to Dewey was a constant cycle of equilibrium and disequilibrium.
48. For more on the issues related to new governance and experimentalism, see

generally Grinne de Biirca, New Governance and Experimentalism: An Introduction,
2010 WIS. L. REV. 227.
49. See Solomon, supra note 15, at 593-97. In the European context, democratic
experimentalism is occurring within the European Union in relation to the coordination of
top-down, as well as bottom-up, learning processes. See Erika Szyszczak, Experimental

Governance: The Open Method of Coordination,12 EUR. L.J. 486, 496 (2006).
50. Lobel, supra note 18, at 65.
51. For more on this idea and the regulation literature, see, for example, MILTON
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962); PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY & ANDREW R.
GOETZ, AIRLINE DEREGULATION AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE MYTHOLOGY (1992); MARTHA

DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION (1985); DAN IMMERGLUCK,
FORECLOSED: HIGH-RISK LENDING, DEREGULATION, AND THE UNDERMINING OF AMERICA'S
MORTGAGE MARKET (2009); PAUL L. JOSKOW, DEREGULATION (2009); YERGIN &
STANISLAW, supra note 2. Additionally, consider this quotation from Mark Weisbrot, an
economist at the progressive Center for Economic and Policy Research: "Friedman 'had an
enormous impact on the shape of most economies in the world in the last 25 to 35 years'. . .
. 'If you go back to his book Capitalism and Freedom .. . it wasn't even reviewed by major
reviewers like the New York Times. By the end of Reagan's last term, most of his policies
were implemented[.]-.
. . . 'Friedman fought a counterrevolution in the 1950s against
Keynesianism . . . ."'Nobel Economist Milton FriedmanDead at 94, CNN MONEY (Nov. 16,
2006, 6:16 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2006/11/16/news/newsmakers/friedman/.
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been largely debunked. 52 Not only has the administrative state grown in
size (and expense), 53 but there has also been a vast geographical
expansion of regulations in previously unregulated, or less regulated,
spaces. 54 Thus, such notions, which framed much of the conversation
about the shift from the welfare state for so long,5 5 are inaccurate as a
description of the evolution of government and governance.5 6 Much of
the literature on governance that supports, or supported, the evolution
of new governance draws on this insight, as will be seen below.

A. Privatization
The privatization literature57 describes the "withdrawal of the state"
as a provider of public services and, in particular, various forms of social
insurance.5 8 The narrative of privatization is more dramatic and selfapparent in countries such as the United Kingdom (which, during the
"Golden Age," had a more robust welfare state than the United
States),5 9 but it still strongly shapes how many understand this
regulatory shift in the United States.60
Privatization generally refers to the outsourcing of government
services 6 1-"essential services"62-that the state traditionally provided

52. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 5, at 7-12; BRAITHWAITE, supra note 1, at 412; Levi-Faur, supra note 23, at 13-14.
53. See Braithwaite, supra note 4, at 8, 18.
54. See Levi-Faur, supra note 23, at 12-13.
55. See generally AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 5.
56. See Braithwaite, supra note 4, at 8-12.
57. See generally KATE ASCHER, THE POLITICS OF PRIVATISATION (1987); FRIEDMAN,
supra note 51; THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PRIVATIZATION (Thomas Clarke & Christos
Pitelis eds., 1993); YERGIN & STANISLAW, supra note 2; Maxim Boycko et al., A Theory of
Privatisation,106 ECON. J. 309 (1996).
58. Scott, supra note 44, at 148-49 (emphasis omitted).
59. Id.
60. PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF
GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 2-8
(2007).
61. For more on privatization in this sense, see Damian Grimshaw et al., Going
Privately: Partnershipand Outsourcing in UK Public Services, 80 PUB. ADMIN. 475, 475-76
(2002); Dru Stevenson, Privatization of Welfare Services: Delegation by Commercial
Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 83-85 (2003). See also Andrew Kakabadse & Nada
Kakabadse, Outsourcing in the Public Services: A Comparative Analysis of Practice,
Capabilityand Impact, 21 PUB. ADMIN. & DEV. 401 (2001).
62. For the challenge of how to govern privatized essential services, see generally GREG
PALAST ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND REGULATION: HOW THE PUBLIC CAN GOVERN ESSENTIAL
SERVICES (2003). These authors have a broader definition of essential services than the
definition of essential services in which the right to strike is highly limited. See, e.g., A.
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through welfare programs, like the New Deal programs, to for-profit or
nonprofit organizations. 63 The rationale for privatization is, in essence,
that it improves the efficiency of social services provided by allowing
private, usually for-profit, organizations to manage them. 64 By
delegating responsibility, governments achieve provision of more
services at a decreased expense to the public by allowing free market
capitalism to shoulder much of the load.6 5 The main claim is that the
consumers of these services receive better quality and variety of
products, as well as potentially lower prices generated by the efficiency
gains from market competition.66 These efficiency gains increase the
profitability of providing services and boost economic growth, ultimately
leading to more financially stable economies.6 7 Economic growth
increases the tax base, and these gains made by governments are then
passed down to taxpayers, reducing the overall tax burden.6 8 Low taxes
leave more money in the economy, further increasing economic
growth.69 In the end, taxpayers enjoy lower tax burdens, consumers

Pankert, Settlement of Labour Disputes in Essential Services, 119 INT'L LAB. REv. 723,
723-24 (1980).
63. Stevenson, supra note 61, at 86-94; see also Aman, supra note 17. For a more in
depth discussion of the appropriate role for nonprofits and for-profits in programs that are
social services that have been outsourced by government, see generally William P. Ryan,
The New Landscape for Nonprofits, in NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 13
(Victor Futter et al. eds., rev. ed. 2002); Eric Werker & Faisal Z. Ahmed, What Do
Nongovernmental OrganizationsDo?, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 73 (2008).
64. See Catherine Eckel et al., Privatizationand Efficiency: Industry Effects of the Sale
of British Airways, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 275, 297 (1997); William L. Megginson & Jeffry M.
Netter, From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization,39 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 321, 380-81 (2001). However, this assertion is contested. See, e.g., Shinichi
Nishiyama & Kent Smetters, Does Social Security Privatization Produce Efficiency
Gains?, 122 Q.J. ECON. 1677 (2007); George Yarrow et al., Privatizationin Theory and
Practice, 1 ECON. POL'Y 323 (1986) (arguing that the benefits of privatization can often be
achieved through better means).
65. YERGIN & STANISLAW, supra note 2, at 372-74.
66. See, e.g., id. at 373-74; Eckel et al., supranote 64.
67. For a more detailed understanding, see, for example, YERGIN & STANISLAW, supra
note 2, at 372-74. Additionally, consider the "Washington Consensus." See generally John
Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT
5 (John Williamson ed., 1990).
68. For a more detailed understanding of this in a modern context, as well as an
analysis of whether such a policy truly works, see HANG NGUYEN ET AL., TAX POLICY CTR.,
How HARD IS IT TO CUT TAX PREFERENCES TO PAY FOR LOWER TAX RATES? (2012),
available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/412608-Base-Broadening-toOffset-Lower-Rates.pdf.
69. Generally, "[c]orporate taxes are found to be most harmful for growth, followed by
personal income taxes, and then consumption taxes." Asa Johansson et al., Taxation and
Economic Growth 2 (OECD Econ. Dep't, Working Paper No. 620, 2008), available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/241216205486.
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enjoy better services, employees benefit from a better economy, and
governments can channel resources with more focus on a narrower
range of functions. 70
Unfortunately, this theory has already proven too good to be true.
Policies have modified privatization by applying it in a more
incremental, experimental, and responsive manner71 than the initial
enthusiasm encouraged by the failed "Washington Consensus." 72 Still,
skepticism remains as to whether privatization can be implemented in a
manner that adequately offsets risks to the public interest in delegating
discretion over the management of large segments of society to for-profit
actors. 73 The issue of how to exploit the benefit of privatization while
mitigating its risks is a central struggle within the new governance
literature.

B. Risk Society and Reflexive Government
During the time of the welfare state (approximately from the first
Roosevelt Administration in 1933-1937 until between the Carter
Administration in 1977-1981 and the first Reagan Administration in
1981-1985),74 a prevailing assumption, at least in the earlier years, was
that an effective regulatory architecture could be modeled on commandand-control style regulation.7 5 For instance, Adolf Berle, who was a
central figure in Franklin D. Roosevelt's Brain Trust, predicted that
government experts could employ science to determine what the law
ought to be, while administrative and judicial technologies could enforce
the regulatory architecture devised to implement the law.76 Like

70. For a more detailed understanding, see generally YERGIN & STANISLAW, supra note
2.
71. See generally John Bennett et al., Methods of Privatizationand Economic Growth
in Transition Economies, 15 ECON. TRANSITION 661 (2007); THE WORLD BANK, ECONOMIC
GROWTH IN THE 1990s: LEARNING FROM A DECADE OF REFORM 165-95 (2005), available at
http://wwwl.worldbank.org/prem/lessonsl990s/.
72. See Dani Rodrik, Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A
Review of the World Bank's Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of
Reforii, 44 J. EcON. LITERATURE 973 (2006); see also YERGIN & STANISLAW, supra note 2,
at 237; Williamson, supranote 67 (including additional comments to Williamson's article).
73. See Rodrik, supranote 72, at 986.
74. Salamon argues that "the Carter administration began in the latter 1970s to
restrain the growth of government social welfare spending" in response to increased fiscal
deficits. Lester M. Salamon, The Marketization of Welfare: Changing Nonprofit and ForProfit Roles in the American Welfare State, 67 SOc. SERV. REV. 16, 20-21 (1993).
75. See, e.g., Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Government Function in a Stabilized National
Economy, 33 AM. EcON. REV. 27 (1943).
76. See, e.g., id. at 37.
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others, 77 Berle made assumptions about natural hazards and
manufactured . risks and how they related to science and its
technologies. However, these proved to be overly optimistic, simplistic, 78
and more problematic than anticipated.7 9
Anthony Giddens suggests that the manufacturing of uninsurable
risk by progress, and not the financial cost of the welfare state, red to
state retrenchment.8 0 The state was unable to devise a way to use
regulatory architecture to solve the problems created by progress.8 1
Faced with this, governments were caught between a rock and a hard
place: the social experiment of using the welfare state to mitigate the
dangers of progress was unworkable, and the prospect of reverting to a
pre-progress, pre-industrial society was similarly impractical. Thus, the
social contract, which obliged the state to mitigate the social and
environmental risks caused by industrialization, was in breach. 82 The
state could not meet these lofty commitments. As a result, the first
project of "embedded liberalism" was a failure and the state retreated.83
From this perspective, the welfare state model proved unable to
adequately identify risks or adequately devise solutions that did not
manufacture new risks and greater complexity. 84 This inability left "the
path of progress" 85 highly uncertain,8 6 and this uncertainty ultimately
led to the demise of the welfare state and to the rise of privatization.8 7
With no way back and no way forward, the state retrenched,
resulting in what Ulrich Beck, Giddens's colleague, calls "reflexive
77. See generally Kerry Rittich, Functionalism and Formalism: Their Latest
Incarnations in Contemporary Development and Governance Debates, 55 U. TORONTO L.J.
853 (2005).
78. See generally BECK, supra note 22; Beck et al., supranote 22.

79. See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, FederalRegulation in HistoricalPerspective, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 1189, 1318 (1986) (referring to a failure to consider the costs and benefits of various
regulatory options).
80. Anthony Giddens, Risk and Responsibility, 62 MOD. L. REV. 1, 4-10 (1999).

81. See id.
82. See generally BECK, supranote 22.
83. For more on the idea of "embedded liberalism," see, for example, Andrew T.F. Lang,

Reconstructing Embedded Liberalism:John Gerard Ruggie and ConstructivistApproaches
to the Study of the InternationalTrade Regime, in EMBEDDING GLOBAL MARKETS 13 (John
Gerard Ruggie

ed.,

2008); Jeffrey A.

Hart & Aseem Prakash,

The Decline of

'Embedded Liberalism'andthe Rearticulationof the Keynesian Welfare State, 2 NEW POL.
ECON. 65 (1997); Ruggie, supranote 35.
84. See Giddens, supra note 80, at 9-10.
85. For the phrase's origin, see generally MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & RONALD J.
DANIELS, RULE OF LAW REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT: CHARTING THE FRAGILE PATH OF
PROGRESS (2008).
86. See Beck et al., supra note 22, at 10-13 (referring to the unforeseeable and
accidental future, and how it cannot be planned for or controlled).
87. See, e.g., id.; Giddens, supranote 80, at 4-10.
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modernization."88 Mitchell Dean uses the term "reflexive government" as
an alternative term for "reflexive modernity."8 9 Dean writes that
reflexive government is "a folding back of the objectives .

.

. upon its

means."9 0 In other words, government legitimacy is now measured by
the efficiency of how it provides services (means), not what services it
provides (objectives), because as Giddens explained, the calculus of
determining what services ought to exist has been exposed as
unworkable.91 In other words, governments are at a loss as to how to
solve the challenges they face. As a result, they outsource
responsibilities to the private sector and focus squarely on improving
efficiency of the remaining regimes of practice within their purview of
power to maintain legitimacy. 92 As long as governments operate with a
legitimate measure of accountability (a calculus of risk management
and economic efficiency),9 3 the larger issue of whether such government
initiatives promote the long-term sustainability of society can be
shadowed by technocratic narratives. 94 Thus, governments limit their
function and fixate on the efficiency of their internal control systems as
a measure of performance.
Accounting scholar Michael Power details how technocratic
narratives "have filtered into regulatory organizations [providing] a
blueprint for the governance and accountability of the regulatory
decision process."95 Power also agrees with the above-mentioned
thinkers in this area that such patterns of reflexive government are
leading to a new and potentially dangerous political economy.96
C. Decentered Regulation
The decentered literature covers a broad spectrum of ideology from
neoclassical economic thinkers, such as Milton Friedman9 7 and
Friedrich Hayek,9 8 to governance scholars with roots in responsive law,
88. BECK, supranote 22, at 10.
89. See MITCHELL DEAN, GOVERNMENTALITY: POWER AND RULE IN MODERN SOCIETY

208-12 (2d ed. 2010).
90. Id. at 207.
91. See Giddens, supranote 80, at 4-10.
92. See DEAN, supra note 89, at 207-08.
93. See MICHAEL POWER, ORGANIZED UNCERTAINTY: DESIGNING A WORLD OF RISK
MANAGEMENT 2-7, 91 (2007).

94. See infra Part III, for more on technocratic narratives.
95. POWER, supranote 93, at 91.
96. See id. at 91-92.
97. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL
STATEMENT (1980).
98. See generally Hayek, supranote 16.
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such as John Braithwaite9 9 and David Levi-Fair, 0 0 to those with roots
in systems theory and reflexive law, such as Julia Black 0 1 and Colin
Scott.102

Friedman and Hayek, in particular, have become synonymous with
predicting the failures of the welfare state.103 Historical narratives
focused on their work have explained that governments, with the
United States and United Kingdom leading the way, privatized and
deregulated their regulatory models. 104 Top-down, command- and-control
regulatory techniques were abandoned, and "free markets" were
unleashed.105 "Free markets," rhetoric aside, mean regulators create
more discretionary, process-based regulation of markets and society,
which allows private actors-generally for-profit actors-to exercise
more discretion within regulated spaces.106
One of the foundational claims of this neoclassical academic and
political movement was that the "man on the spot" enjoyed the most
intimate vantage point, and this helped him understand complex
society.107 For this reason, some assumed that with the aid of the price
mechanism, the "man on the spot" was in the best position to make
decisions in regulated spaces.108 For instance, Hayek would likely
suggest that Goldman Sachs does not need a centralized public
bureaucracy to operate within the global economy. Goldman Sachs is
the "man on the spot," having the most intimate knowledge of the ever99. See generally BRAITHWAITE, supra note 1.
100. See generally Levi-Faur & Jordana, supra note 41.
101. See generally Black, supra note 24.
102. See generally Scott, supra note 44.
103. See YERGIN & STANISLAW, supra note 2, at 80-81, 126-27.
104. See id. at 96-105 (describing, for example, how Margaret Thatcher was able to start
and successfully carry out a privatization program in the United Kingdom). For an
understanding of how these changes played out in the Canadian welfare state model, see
generally H.W. Arthurs, Rethinking Administrative Law: A Slightly Dicey Business, 17
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1 (1979); H.W. Arthurs, Jonah and the Whale: The Appearance,
Disappearance,and Reappearance of Administrative Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 225 (1980);
STATES AGAINST MARKETS: THE LIMITS OF GLOBALIZATION (Robert Boyer & Daniel Drache
eds., 1996); Harry W. Arthurs, The Re-constitution of the Public Domain, in THE MARKET
OR THE PUBLIC DOMAIN?: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE ASYMMETRY OF POWER 85 (Daniel
Drache ed., 2001); Harry W. Arthurs, The Administrative State Goes to Market (and Cries
'Wee, Wee, Wee' All the Way Home), 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 797 (2005); DANIEL DRACHE,
DEFIANT PUBLICS: THE UNPRECEDENTED REACH OF THE GLOBAL CITIZEN (2008); Harry
Arthurs, The Hollowing Out of Corporate Canada:Implications for TransnationalLabor
Law, Policy and Practice,57 BUFFALO L. REV. 781 (2009).
105. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, Free Markets and Free Speech, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 1 (1987) (discussing the benefits of free markets and a free society).
106. See YERGIN & STANISLAW, supranote 2, at 406-08.
107. Hayek, supranote 16, at 524-25.
108. Id.
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changing information it must balance in its decisionmaking processes.
As for the knowledge Goldman Sachs lacks, Hayek would argue that no
actor enjoys perfect knowledge, but the price mechanism adequately
supplements these limits by providing information about other market
actors. 109

The "man on the spot" is plugged into the knowledge of the facts on
the ground. As such, groups of these actors are collectively, from various
decentralized locations, in the best positions to exercise governance
discretion, since each has an intimate knowledge of the small segment
of the regulated space in which each operates. 110 Consequently, by
exploiting the power of information exchange technologies (such as the
price mechanism,111 knowledge brokers, and auditing and reporting
processes112), regulators can create "knowledge networks,"" 3 which
provide decentered actors the additional information they need to
coordinate activities, and accordingly govern society.
This sort of thinking emphasizes that an important dimension of an
effectively regulated space is the willingness of those regulated to
respect, follow, and actively participate (to the best of their ability) as
partners in the regulatory process.1 14 In fact, such governance strategies
are regarded as dependent on the information that exchanges between
regulators and the regulated to learn of and respond to complex

109. Id.
110. Of course, this extends beyond what Hayek was suggesting, but one may imagine
how this applies to Hayek's knowledge theory. See generally Hayek, supra note 16.
111. See id. at 524-28.
112. Knowledge brokers are people or organizations that act as intermediaries between
the different manufacturers of knowledge, providing linkages and resources. They are
conduits for channeling information through a social network (like a regulated space). For
more on knowledge brokers, see, for example, Andrew B. Hargadon, Brokering Knowledge:
Linking Learning and Innovation, 24 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 41 (2002); Andrew B. Hargadon,
Firms as Knowledge Brokers: Lessons in Pursuing Continuous Innovation, 40 CAL. MGMT.
REV. 209, 210-11 (1998); Gianmario Verona et al., Innovation and Virtual Environments:
Towards Virtual Knowledge Brokers, 27 ORG. STUD. 765, 765 (2006).
113. The use of the term "knowledge network" is as an analogy to other literatures that
use the term. For instance, some have explored the idea of a "knowledge network" for
coordinating and management at the organization level. See, e.g., Andreas Seufert et al.,
Towards Knowledge Networking, 3 J. KNOWLEDGE MGMT. 180 (1999); William Swan et al.,
Viewing the Corporate Community as a Knowledge Network, 5 CORP. COMM. 97 (2000).
Others think of it in a most literal sense as a bank of knowledge that still has coordinating
and management application potential, but not so much in the classical regulatory sense.

See, e.g., Sandy J. Andelman et al., UnderstandingEnvironmental Complexity Through a
Distributed Knowledge Network, 54 BIOSCIENCE 240 (2004); Martin Doerr & Dolores
lorizzo, The Dream of a Global Knowledge Network-A New Approach, 1 J. COMPUTING &
CULTURAL HERITAGE 1 (2008).
114. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 1, at 88-97.
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regulatory challenges in a timely and effective manner 15 or, more
dramatically, simply to avoid regulatory failure.
Since such information exchanges between actors within a regulated
space need to be effective, maintaining nonadversarial relationships is
given a top priority to facilitate communication, coordination, and
learning.1 16 The problem is that this priority can hamper meaningful
enforcement mechanisms in some cases as the regulator becomes fearful
that paternalistic punishment of the regulated may undermine their
partnership, thus compromising the information exchanges within the
regulated space.11 7 This places the regulator in a dilemma: if it wishes to
have effective information exchanges so as to have the best possible
knowledge about a regulated space, then it must not enforce such
regulation with vigor because it may alienate the regulated, on whom it
relies to inform it about changes in the regulated space."18 On the other
hand, if a regulator does not enforce its regulations, or has regulations
without "real teeth," then the regulated may not take the "law" of the
regulated space seriously," 9 creating new informal norms, which can
dictate how the regulated space functions and can thus compromise the
regulator's intentions.120
From this perspective, governance is a channeling of discretionary
authority from government agencies to more hybrid and decentered
public-private governance processes,121 in the hope of establishing social
relationships with "the man on the spot."122 This channeling is deemed
necessary to exploit decentered decisionmaking through information
exchange technologies.123 This results in the replacement of substancebased, state-imposed regulation with process-based, public-private coregulation and co-governance.1 24

115. See id. at 65, 70, 79.
116. See id. at 88-97.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See, e.g., Clark J. Lee, Federal Regulation of Hospital Resident Work Hours:
Enforcement with Real Teeth, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 162 (2006) (highlighting the
need for federal regulation of working hours for medical residents and interns to ensure
adequate implementation and enforcement).
120. This is what Coffee suggested happened with the Credit Crisis and the shift in
leverage regulation of banks. See Coffee, supranote 13, at 1-2.
121. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 1, at 7-8.
122. Hayek, supranote 16, at 524 (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. See Black, supra note 24, at 103-05 (discussing the proposition that governments
should not have a monopoly on regulation over social actors).
124. See generally THE POLITICS OF REGULATION, supra note 44. For the resulting
dangers of this practice, see Philip Alston, Facing Up to the Complexities of the 11O's Core
Labour StandardsAgenda, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 467 (2005).
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Governments restrict their function to devising strategic plans for
regulated spaces (called steering), leaving a large portion of the
application, monitoring, and enforcement of these strategies (called
rowing) to nonstate actors.125 As a result, regulation is becoming
intimately linked to other ordering processes. such as markets, civil
society networks, and the internal control and risk management
mechanisms of corporate governance.126 In theory, the state creates the
steering rules, but in practice this is only partly true since private
participation in strategic rulemaking is becoming more common in
regulated spaces.127 Consequently, the distinction between steering and
128
rowing is blurred.
When looking at such regulation, for instance the California
Occupational Safety and Health Act Cooperative Compliance Plan, 129 it
is not so easy to draw a distinction between the Act's, regulations
(steering) and the rules. emerging from the regulated (rowing).130 Many
of the rowing norms are also strategic and steering in nature. The
blurring between external institutional norms (strategic steering
regulations) and internal organizational norms (operational rowing
norms) demonstrates that the differentiation between who is steering
and who is rowing is not so clear.1st In such heterarchically regulated
spaces, assumptions cannot be made regarding which norms, control
mechanisms, and regulatory participants are, in fact, directing the
evolution of regulatory norms at any given time.132 Upon reflection, one
might pause and conclude that this evolution of heterarchically
regulated spaces is a sign of publicization; however, that might be
premature. Without any empirical evidence that these for-profit private

125. See Levi-Faur, supra note 23, at 15-16.
126. To be clear, although state law will always be present within post-statist
regulatory processes, it becomes a question of whether the law is steering these regulatory
processes or whether these regulatory processes are steering themselves.
127. See Harter, supra note 20, at 414-22 (identifying the considerable benefits yielded
from the collaboration of private and public actors in creating policy).
128. See id.; POWER, supranote 93, at 41-42.
129. For more details on the plan, see Brian Friel, OSHA: Cooperative Compliance,
GOv'T EXECUTIVE (Dec. 8, 1997), http://www.govexec.com/federal-news/1997/12/oshacooperative-compliance/5176/.
130. For a general understanding of the situation, see POWER, supra note 93, at 36-42.
For an analysis of the benefits and pitfalls of the strategy of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, see, for example, Marius Aalders & Ton Wilthagen, Moving Beyond
Command-and-Control: Reflexivity in the Regulation of Occupational Safety and Health
and the Environment, 19 LAW & POL'Y 415 (1997); Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and
IndustrialRelations: The Governance of Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071 (2005).
131. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 1, at 8 (noting the "reality of hybridity between the
privatization of the public and publicization of the private").
132. See Scott, supranote 44, at 146, 154.
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actors, who have stepped into the traditional role of a governmental
agency, are, as Freeman put it, "increasingly commit[ing] themselves to
traditionally public goals," 133 this cannot be assumed to be more than
merely privatization without publicization.
Regulatory architects within these heterarchically regulated spaces
are experimenting with reflexive,134 responsive,135 decentered,136 and
collaborative 37 techniques to harness incentive mechanisms, many
times market-based ones.138 The umbrella term "regulatory capitalism"
captures many of these dimensions of decentered governance. 39 Looking
forward, future regulated spaces may host co-governance mechanisms
in which the state, although present, plays a minor role. Such spaces of
the future have been associated with an understanding of the "postregulatory state." 140 Many elements of this post-regulatory state exist
today, including auditing and reporting mechanisms,141 as well as the
incorporation of private monitoring of regulated spaces by nonstate
gatekeepers.1 42 These gatekeepers can dwell in civil society, much like
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 143 or in the business
sector, such as Moody's Investors Services.1 4 Proliferation of these
mechanisms is the most obvious sign of this emerging decentered
order.145 But the question remains: Will these private actors have the
133. Freeman, supra note 3, at 1285.
134. See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 239 (1983); Zumbansen, supra note 22.
135. See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supranote 5.
136. See, e.g., Black, supra note 24.
137. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 20.
138. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Models for Environmental Regulation: Central
PlanningVersus Market-Based Approaches, 19 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 547, 548 (1992).
139. See, e.g., David Levi-Faur, Regulatory Architectures for a Global Democracy: On
Democratic Varieties of Regulatory Capitalism, in THE CHALLENGES OF GLOBAL BUSINESS
AUTHORITY 205 (Tony Porter & Karsten Ronit eds., 2010); David Levi-Faur, Varieties of
Regulatory Capitalism: Sectors and Nations in the Making of a New Global Order, 19
GOVERNANCE 363 (2006); Levi-Faur & Jordana, supranote 41.
140. Scott, supra note 44, at 146.
141. See POWER, supra note 93, at 53, 90, 152-81; see also MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT
SOCIETY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION (1997).
142. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet on Modern
Securities Regulation, 52 BUS. LAW. 1195, 1210-13, 1232-33 (1997); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Gatekeeper Failureand Reform: The Challenge of FashioningRelevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L.
REV. 301, 305-07, 334-35 (2004).
143. See
How
Is
a
Company
Certified
as
Cruelty-Free?,
PETA,
http://www.peta.org/about/faq/how-is-a-company-certified-as-cruelty-free.aspx (last visited
Mar. 31, 2014) (classifying as "cruelty-free" those companies that have signed PETA's
statement of assurance or provided a statement that they do not conduct animal testing).
144. MOODY'S, http://www.moodys.com/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
145. See generally POWER, supranote 93; POWER, supra note 141; MICHAEL POWER, THE
RISK MANAGEMENT OF EVERYTHING: RETHINKING THE POLITICS OF UNCERTAINTY (2004).
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requisite public spiritedness to sacrifice self-interest when called upon
to do so?

D. Conclusion
Faith in the reassertion of the public interest within governance
appears in works of conscientious governance theories like those of
Braithwaite and Freeman, suggesting that a counterbalance to
privatization is occurring.146 The hope is that, as the bright-line
distinction between public and private blurs further, some of the
rationalities that legitimate profitmaking on the cusp of legality 47 Will
be brought under more scrutiny by the "unwieldy" public14 8 and
academics,1 49 resulting in for-profit actors becoming more societally
minded.
Linguistically, regulatory scholars have introduced the language of
"public-private partnership" 50 and "governance" 5 1 into the lexicon of

146. See generally BRAITHWAITE, supra note 1; Freeman, supra note 3; Braithwaite,
supranote 4, at 8, 18; Braithwaite, supranote 7.
147. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 38-39 (1991).
148. See, e.g., Talking About a Revolution, ECONOMIST, Apr. 7, 2012, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/21552179; Rage Against the Machine, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22,
2011, available at http://www.economist.comlnode/21533400.
149. See, e.g., DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (2005); THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY:
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW (Doreen McBarnet et al. eds., 2007);

Ruth V. Aguilera et al., Putting the S Back in CorporateSocial Responsibility:A Multilevel
Theory of Social Change in Organizations, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 836 (2007); Aaron K.
Chatterji & Barak D. Richman, Understanding the "Corporate" in Corporate Social
Responsibility, 2 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 33 (2008); Peer Zumbansen, Rethinking the
Nature of the Firm: The Corporationas a Governance Object, 35 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 1469
(2012).
150. See generally PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIPS:
MANAGING
RISKS
AND
OPPORTUNITIES (Akintola Akintoye et al. eds., 2003); PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS:
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Stephen P. Osborne ed., 2000);
E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (2000); Wolfgang
Kleinwcechter, From Self-Governance to Public-PrivatePartnership:The ChangingRole of
Governments in the Management of the Internet's Core Resources, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1103 (2003); Chris Skelcher, Public-PrivatePartnershipsand Hybridity, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 347 (Ewan Ferlie et al. eds., 2005); Gerry Stoker,
Public-Private Partnerships and Urban Governance, in PARTNERSHIPS IN URBAN
GOVERNANCE: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 34 (Jon Pierre ed., 1998); Aidan R.

Vining & Anthony E. Boardman, Public-Private Partnerships: Eight Rules for
Governments, 13 PUB. WORKS MGMT. & POL'Y 149 (2008).
151. See generally THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE
(Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002); Jody Freeman, The PrivateRole in Public Governance, 75
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discourse. Politically, a "double movement"152 against privatization and
deregulation has increased support globally for greater accountability of
for-profit actors.153 Vocationally, a strong corporate social responsibility
discourse has entered into many top U.S. business schools.1 54 But
functionally, there is scant evidence to support the claim that for-profit
actors are assuming the role of public servants, and yet faith in the
publicization of for-profit activities within governance remains strong.155
This, in part, exposes a fragility in the new governance project: the
potential that the hope of publicization makes privatization more
palatable, but no less threatening to public interest.
So, is this faith in publicization misplaced? Jody Freeman's account
of publicization assumes that private actors promise to uphold
"traditionally public goals," because this is "the price" governments
demand in order for these private actors to have access to these
"lucrative opportunities."15 6 Does privatization play out under these
conditions? Are governments generally in the position to make such
demands? Short of having to cope with a political crisis of catastrophic
proportions, are governments willing and able to reverse privatization
initiatives merely because they are disappointed with the performance
of private actors?
Some suggest not, arguing that the state withdrew from being a
service provider because it could not afford to provide such services. 57
This is a story of governments amassing debt in a manner that no
financially prudent and socially conscious citizen with an eye to the

N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000); B. Guy Peters & John Pierre, Governance Without Government?
Rethinking Public Administration,8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 223 (1998).
152. POLANYI, supra note 35, at 79, 136.
153. See Talking About a Revolution, supra note 148; Rage Against the Machine, supra
note 148.
154. Top U.S. business schools with a new emphasis on Corporate Social Responsibility
include: University of Michigan (Ross), Yale School of Management, Stanford Graduate
School of Business, Notre Dame (Mendoza), University of California Berkeley (Haas), New
York University (Stern), Columbia Business School, University of Virginia (Darden),
Cornell (Johnson), and George Washington University School of Business. Cindy Hoots,
The Aspen Institute's Top 10 Business Schools IntegratingCorporate Social Responsibility,
INSPIRED EcONOMIsT (Oct. 21, 2009), http://inspiredeconomist.com/2009/10/21/the-aspeninstitutes-top- 10-business-schools-focused-on-corporate-social-responsibility/.
155. Braithwaite, supra note 7, at 4.
156. Freeman, supranote 3, at 1285.
157. For a historical perspective post-Bretton Woods, see THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE
LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (rev. ed. 2000). For a more contemporary view on the fiscal
pressures facing the state, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and
the Fiscal Crisisof the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000).
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welfare of the next generation could tolerate,15 8 so they were forced to
privatize. This would not appear to be a situation in which private
actors would be fearful that a government might reverse privatization,
if private actors failed to uphold traditionally public goals.
That said, this financial justification for state withdrawal may not
be altogether convincing, considering that, in the U.S. context, every
administration, both Democratic and Republican, since the Reagan
Administration has increased the national debt. 59 In fact, the Reagan
Administration, which to many represents the model for fiscal
responsibility, did not decrease the overall national debt during its two
terms.160 Either way, considering the massive amount of national debt
in the United States, it appears unlikely that private actors need be too
fearful that the government will reverse privatization-at least in the
U.S. context.
Placing the issue of financial capacity to one side, both the risk and
decentered regulation literatures suggest that governments cannot
reverse privatization because government experts alone cannot
determine how to regulate society. In short, governments need
privatization-or at least private actors-to participate in exercising
governance discretion from various decentralized locations because, as
the decentered governance literature suggests, these actors possess an
intimate and detailed knowledge of a segment of the regulated space,
which government actors need to effectively understand and manage
society.161 Thus, the idea that publicization is the price that
governments demand for private actors to have access to "lucrative
opportunities" may not be accurate. The more frightening possibility,
and possibly the more accurate one, is precisely the opposite:
privatization is the price that private actors demand to allow for
governments to govern adequately.
II. THE GATES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
There are a number of rudimentary ideas that have become anchors
for how judges, lawyers, and corporate legal scholars understand the

158. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED

STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 5-10, 21-23 (2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/hist.pdf.
159. Id. at 22-23 (charting the budget deficits from Reagan up to the present).
160. Braithwaite notes the financial analysis of Tramontozzi and Chilton, writing:
"Overall, real business regulatory spending increased 10 per cent during the Reagan
years." Braithwaite, supra note 4, at 8.
161. Of course, this extends beyond what Hayek was suggesting, but one may imagine
how this applies to Hayek's knowledge theory. See generally Hayek, supra note 16.
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corporation and the law that regulates it. This section introduces a
number of them. Although this section presents each of these ideas in a
largely uncontested manner, there are, of course, minority voices that
contest them. 162 That said, corporate legal scholars in the U.S. context
tend to be more conservative than their European counterparts. Thus,
American academics see many of the ideas presented below as
commonsense positions. This position, on consideration, ought to make
one pause to seriously consider, or reconsider, whether Corporate
America is well suited or willing to assume the social responsibilities
that a publicization of the corporation would entail.
A. The Lex Mercatoria
At its core, free market ideology suggests that if societies strive
toward the ideal free market, many of today's social problems would be
closer to being alleviated. 163 Although many accept this without much
investigation, the notion is rooted in the story of the medieval European
merchant order. 164 This order existed beyond state law.165 Accordingly,
it was developed through custom and best practice.166 Merchants
developed and administered their own laws, and the state rarely
interfered. 167 To many, it is a shining example of a period of a purer
private ordering in which market mechanisms and social norms
162. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Welfare, Dialectic,and Mediation in Corporate Law,
2 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 59 (2005); William Klein, Criteria for Good Laws of Business
Association, 2 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 13 (2005).
163. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 51, at 201-02 ("I believe that we shall be able to preserve
and extend freedom.... But we shall be able to do so ... only if we persuade our fellow
men that free institutions offer a surer . . . route to the ends they seek than the coercive
power of the state."); MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE WITH POWER AND
MARKET 1366 (2d ed. 2009) ("The more the market principle prevails in a society,
therefore, the greater will be that society's freedom and its prosperity.").
164. L6pez Rodriguez argues that during the Middle Ages, and for the following
hundreds of years, uniform commercial rules were enforced through "the market tribunals
of the various European trade centers." ANA M. L6PEZ RODRIGUEZ, LEX MERCATORIA AND
HARMONIZATION OF CONTRACT LAW IN THE EU 87 (2003) (Den.).
165. It is suggested that these medieval uniform rules did not have the "benefit of state
enforcement of contracts," but slowly "evolved their own private code of laws," which were
enforced by a "local official or a private merchant." Paul R. Milgrom et al., The Role of
Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the
Champagne Fairs,2 EcON. & POL. 1, 2 (1990).
166. This medieval merchant law, which developed privately through best practice,
provides a model for how law might be constructed and implemented today. Robert D.
Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1647 (1996). See also
Milgrom et al., supra note 165, at 2.
167. See Cooter, supra note 166, at 1647; see also Milgrom et al., supra note 165, at 2.
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governed and society flourished. 168 This story of lex mercatoria
(merchant law) celebrates the past prowess and future potential of the
free market.
Although this story is not historically accurate, it still establishes a
"common ground" for the proponents of the free market. 169 It is used as
the model solution to solve social problems.170 Free market champions
hold this image of the free market in their minds-and hearts-when
they advocate for the protection of the freedom of contract, the
inalienability of property, and minimal government intervention."
Their arguments hint that a world without government is possible and
desirable.172 Their views reflect a deep mistrust of government17 3 and a
conviction that market function can spontaneously order complex
society effectively.174 At the core of this free market ideology is the
suggestion that the hand of equity, of government intervention, and of
publicization is unnecessary because the visible hand of the market will
provide equity if markets are allowed to operate freely. Meritocracy will
take care of the rest. 75 This faith in free market ideology loosely
underpins much of corporate governance thinking.
B. CorporateLaw as Merely Protectorof the Market Mechanism
Much of corporate legal scholarship regards corporate law as the
protector of the freedom of contract and the inalienability of property.
Many think that, by simply protecting these fundamentals of market
function, corporate law ensures that corporate management will be
driven by competition to constantly strive for lower transaction costs
and, as a result, greater efficiency within the corporation. 7 6
168. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 166, at 1647; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 51
(applying this idea in a more general and obvious way).
169. Ralf Michaels, Legal Medievalism in Lex Mercatoria Scholarship, 90 TEX. L. REV.
259, 264 (2012).
170. See id.
171. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 51 (arguing that economic freedom is
necessary for political freedom); ROTHBARD, supra note 163, at 1337-47.
172. See Bruce L. Benson, Enforcement of Private Property Rights in Primitive Societies:
Law Without Government, 9 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 1 (1989); ROTHBARD, supra note 163.
173. See, e.g., F. A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (50th Anniversary ed. 1994).
174. See Hayek, supra note 16, at 519-20. Hayek claimed that markets lead to a "more
efficient allocation of [societal] resources than any design could achieve." CHRISTINA
PETSOULAS, HAYEK'S LIBERALISM AND ITS ORIGINS 2 (2001) (quoting F. A. HAYEK, NEW
STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 63-64 (1978)).
175. See Shikha Dalmia, The Fable of Market Meritocracy, FORBES MAGAZINE, Feb.
2010, available at http://www.forbes.com/2010/02/09/markets-finance-sarkozy-economicsopinions-columnists-shikha-dalmia.html.
176. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 147, at 35.
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Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel explained that unlike
administrative law, in which the discretion of administrative officials
needs to be tightly constrained, corporate law does not have to police
corporate managers in the same way.' 77 The reason is that there is
already an enforcement mechanism in place-the market. 178 If corporate
managers do not do their jobs, then corporate profits decrease, which
affects share price and results in ex ante contractual penalties for the
managers.1 79 These penalties potentially include a decrease in the value
of stock options, termination of employment, damage to reputation, and
acquisition. 180
, For the market mechanism to enforce efficient internal order within
corporate governance, corporate law need only address the issues
related to agency between shareholders and management-to be clear,
corporate law need only ensure that corporate managers have one
"master": shareholders.' 8 1 The market mechanism will do the rest.
Otherwise, if corporate law directs corporate managers to have loyalties
to both the investor and the community, the law would free managers
from the discipline of the market, opening up the opportunity for them
to serve neither.182
An idea that accompanies this thinking is that, for regulators to
police corporate behavior, they need only harness the market. For
instance, if a regulator imposes a large enough fine for a violation of a
regulation, the regulator will have made effective use of the firm's
strength. According to Easterbrook and Fischel, the firm's strength is in
its ability to calculate risks and rewards, and, thus, imposing such a
fine will effectively prevent violation of the regulation.183
Of course, this regulatory solution is not nuanced-effectively
enforcing large fines against corporations-but it does provide an
adequate rationale to protect the operation of the market mechanism
within corporate governance. This is what is really at stake for
corporate legal scholars like Easterbrook and Fischel-economic
accountability to shareholders, not social responsibility. With this
solution to regulatory challenges, the status quo corporate structure
remains. In theory, the corporation is still encouraged to "maximize
wealth" creation,184 while regulators have an effective mechanism to

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id. at 2-3, 35.
See id. at 6.
See id.
See id. at 37-38.
Id. at 38.
Id.
Id.
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alter behavior without reforming corporate law. 85 This arrangement
leaves "managers free to maximize the wealth of the residual claimants
[shareholders] subject to the social constraints."186
Upon reflection, Easterbrook and Fischel clearly established the
public-private distinction within corporate law, explaining precisely
where the iron gates against government intervention within corporate
law ought to be constructed-at its very border. Most corporate legal
scholars agree with Easterbrook and Fischel that corporate law best
serves society as an economizing device that facilitates wealth creation
and encourages corporate management to keep transaction costs low
and profits high. 87
C. CorporateLaw as the Productof the Market Mechanism
In 1974, William Cary argued that states were competing to attract
corporations to increase state revenues. 188 He thought that this was
creating a dangerous "race to the bottom" for corporate governance
standards.189 He suggested that Delaware, in particular, created
corporate governance standards that favored managerial interests
because corporate managers tended to be the incorporators, and the
state's budget was dependent on revenues from corporations.190 As a
consequence, state competition for corporations was resulting in
managers enjoying broad and unchecked authority, resulting in lessthan-optimal corporate performance.' 9
In 1977, Ralph Winter wrote a reply to Cary, rejecting his position
by arguing that state competition should "tend toward optimality so far
as the shareholder's relationship to the corporation is concerned" and,
thus, corporate governance standards, like those of Delaware, ."are
optimal legal arrangements."192 He agreed with Cary that corporate
management ultimately had the consumer power over incorporation but
argued that managers would select corporate law that reduced
transaction costs and led to more profitable business organizations.193

185. For instance, fines or other sanctions by laws other than corporate law.
186. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 147, at 38.
187. See id. at 35-39.
188. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663, 697 (1974).
189. Id. at 666.
190. See id. at 670.
191. See id. at 667-70.

192. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation,6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254 (1977).
193. See id. at 255-56.
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Thus, state competition produced an optimal corporate law regime. 194
Put differently, what Cary regarded as a "race-to-the-bottom," Winter
regarded as a "race-to-the-top."19 5
This debate has had a number of reincarnations,196 and Winter's
position has consistently won the debate, creating the impression that
corporate law is not a product of politics, but the product of market
forces. 197 Even though recent empirical evidence suggests that other
states simply do not compete with Delaware for its primacy over
incorporations for publicly held corporations in the United States,198 the
perception that U.S. corporate law is the product of market demands
and competition between states still persists.19 9
When combined with the other normative messages addressed
above, one can appreciate that many corporate legal thinkers are
convinced that a corporate law shaped by market forces would lead to
an optimal regime and that any political meddling, such as an attempt
to publicize corporate governance, would be rejected out of hand as, at
best, suboptimal and, at worst, as radical, unworkable, and blindly
naive.
D. The Corporationas a Nexus of Contracts
As regards corporate legal theory, it is important to stress from the
outset that the concession theory, the entity theory, and the aggregate
contractarian theory 200 always inform the legal understanding of the
corporation. 201 This is because the modern corporation has always

194. Id. at 254.
195. See id. at 255-58; Fenner Stewart, Jr., The Place of Corporate Lawmaking in
American Society, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 147, 156 (2010).
196. See Stewart, supra note 195, at 155-57.
197. See id. at 157-64.
198. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 556 (2002);
Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in CorporateLaw, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 679, 684 (2002).
199. See generally Stewart, supra note 195 (examining the growing skepticism in
Delaware's optimal corporate law).
200. The concession theory asserts that corporations are merely creatures of statute.
Fenner L. Stewart, Jr., Indeterminacy and Balance: A Path to a Wholesome Corporate
Law, 9 RUTGERS Bus. L. REV. 81, 95-96 (2012). The entity theory asserts that the
corporation is something that exists beyond its aggregate parts. See id. at 99. The
aggregate contractarian theory argues that the corporation is the sum of the contractual
obligations that each of its constituents (labor, management, shareholders, creditors, the
community-at-large, etc.) owe to each of its other constituents. See id. at 120.
201. Id. at 95.
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been 202 a group of aggregate constituentS203 connected through
contract, 204 while at the same time, the corporation is an entity with
personhood that only exists because of a concession made by the state. 205
Today, in the U.S. legal context, the corporation is generally thought of
in terms of a version of a theory overbalanced with a contractarian
understanding of the corporation, 206 which is captured by the nexus-ofcontracts theory. 207 This article calls this the aggregate contractarian
theory.
This imbalance within U.S. corporate theory conveys an
understanding of the corporation as a set of consensual and efficient
contracts that bind corporate constituents. 208 This version of corporate
theory suggests that a high level of efficiency occurs between corporate
constituents because relaxed legal requirements allow market forces to
inspire them to optimally negotiate contracts to satisfy their own
interests. 209 Since this arrangement is regarded as the best option for
the corporation as an economizing device, 210 it follows that corporate law

202. For a historical account of the rise of the modern corporation at the end of the
nineteenth century, see Stewart, supra note 195, at 151-55.
203. Thomas W. Joo, Theories and Models of Corporate Governance, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: A SYNTHESIS OF THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 157, 159 (H. Kent
Baker & Ronald Anderson eds., 2010); see also Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118
U.S. 394 (1886) (regarding the assessment of taxes on a consolidated railroad corporation).
204. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization,62 AM. EcoN. REV. 777, 783 (1972).
205. For more on the historical roots of the concession theory, see William W. Bratton,
Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: CriticalPerspectives from History, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1502-05 (1989).
206. See generally Stewart, supranote 200.
207. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical
Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 457-58, 464 (1989) (arguing that "[tihe nexus of
contracts concept places the corporation on a foundation of contractual consent" and
discussing the presence of "real adherents" to the "new economic theory" of the firm that is
gaining legitimacy in legal discourse). For an example of a "real adherent," see STEPHEN
M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 30-31
(2008) (explaining Bainbridge's application of "The Hypothetical Bargain Methodology").
208. See generally Stewart, supranote 200. But see Joo, supra note 203, at 170 (arguing
that "incorporating efficient-market assumptions, contractarianism makes two claims:
that governance is consensual and that it is efficient").
209. See Thomas W. Joo, Contract, Property,and the Role of Metaphor in Corporations
Law, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 779, 800 (2002) (arguing that the contractarian vision of
contract is a laissez-faire one, which justifies the assumption that "economic relationships
are the product of individual free will and rational deliberation, and the law respects them
for this reason"). For an excellent example of an adherent to this theory, see BAINBRIDGE,
supra note 207, at 30-31 (explaining Bainbridge's application of "The Hypothetical
Bargain Methodology").
210. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 147, at 35-39.
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must remain permissive, rejecting mandatory legal rules as generally
suboptimal. 211
On closer inspection of corporate governance, this theory suggests
that large, sophisticated investors play a central role in making
corporate governance work within this legal market framework. 212 (In
theory, professional investors and their consultants provide analysis of
corporate management, governance structures, debt-equity ratios, and
relative prowess when compared to competitors, 213 which supplies the
price mechanism with enough information for debt and equity markets
to reward good corporate practice and punish poor performance. 214 Thus,
just as Easterbrook and Fischel suggested, what emerges is a corporate
law that allows markets to function competently, encouraging "what is
optimal for the firms and investors."21 5
Within this aggregate contractarian theory, fair treatment of
corporate constituents is rationalized as follows. If a corporate
constituent does not like the terms of a proposed contract with a
corporation, it can negotiate for new terms, demand a higher price for
contracting, or choose not to enter into a contract with the corporation
in question. 216 It is a consensual relationship. 217 If a constituent
(shareholder) is unhappy and markets are highly liquid, the constituent
can "exit" the relationship. If enough shareholders exit, this will
decrease share value and trigger a reason for management to prevent
further exits, thereby policing managerial opportunism. 218
Furthermore, the cost of contracting will encourage corporate
managers to make choices that balance the transaction costs of making
a decision between all of the constituents affected. 219 In this way, a
contract enforces a balance of power between constituents, for although
corporate managers have much of the ex ante authority, 220 the
contractual ex post consequences discipline such discretionary
behavior. 22 1 For instance, efficient, rational incorporators will select

211. Joo, supranote 203, at 171.
212. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as
Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1291-93 (1991).
213. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 147, at 17-19, 23-24.
214. See id. at 19.
215. Id. at 7.
216. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 207, at 30-31 (explaining Bainbridge's application of
"The Hypothetical Bargain Methodology").
217. See Joo, supra note 203, at 163.
218. For the classic text, see ALBERT 0. HIRScHmAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY:
RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMs, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 21-29 (1970).

219. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 147, at 91-93, 217-18.
220. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 207, at 67-68.
221. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 147, at 91-93, 217-18.
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rules when incorporating that balance the transaction costs of deviating
from the off-the-rack default rules of incorporation with the perceived
benefit of doing so.222 Such freedom of rule selection allows the corporate

form to have greater flexibility to respond to market demands and
223
opportunities.
'That said, some mandatory obligations are imposed on directors and
management in an attempt to counter the inherent potential for power
and/or information asymmetries between actors within corporate
hierarchies. 224 But generally. speaking, such mandatory rules are
discouraged, since most are deemed to be unnecessary, and because the
cost of electing to adopt choices that obviously disadvantage
shareholders or creditors is so high that these choices become de facto
mandatory; the market disciplines, while still leaving discretion for
dynamic, entrepreneurial decisionmaking options. 225
This aggregate contractarian perspective also discourages courts
from attempting to compensate ex post facto for any ex ante errors in
negotiating. If constituents of the corporation fail to negotiate for the
risks involved in a particular contractual relationship, courts should
just leave it to the market to police. 226 Thus, from this perspective, the
role of the courts ought to be as follows: "The courts may not rewrite
[corporate contracts] under the guise of relieving one of the parties from
the hardship of an improvident bargain. The Court cannot protect the
parties from a bad bargain and it will not protect them from bad
luck." 227 In this light, corporate law, and its judicial application, appears
somewhat insensitive to the inequalities between contracting parties. It
is hesitant to impose a stricter standard than freedom of contract, since
doing so might inadvertently undermine market discipline and,
therefore, the corporation as an economizing device. 228

222. See CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 8-20 (6th ed. 2010).
223. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 147, at 34-35.
224. For instance, a director may have a personal interest in the approval of a particular
contract, and in such cases, strict procedural obligations are imposed upon that director.
O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 222, at 277; see also Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc.,
673 A.2d 148, 154-56 (Del. 1996).
225. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supranote 147, at 34-35.
226. See Concord Auto Auction, Inc. v. Rustin, 627 F. Supp. 1526, 1531-33 (D. Mass.
1986).
227. Id. at 1532-33 (internal citations omitted).
228. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supranote 147, at 31-38.
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E. CorporateSocial Responsibility and CorporateLaw
In the classic corporate social responsibility of the Berle-Dodd
debate of the 1930s, the issue was whether corporate power ought to be
in the hands of shareholders as public interest representatives or
managers as stewards of society. 229 In the 1980s and 1990s, the shift
from corporate social responsibility (direct social obligation) to corporate
responsibility (indirect social obligation through wealth creation) is
captured by Easterbrook and Fischel's classic one master theory: if
managers are only accountable to shareholders as investors, the market
will force corporate responsibility (profitmaking).230 If managers are
burdened by split loyalties, the door is open for managerial
opportunism, and, accordingly, wealth production is compromised. 231
Such interference, it was claimed, could easily jeopardize profits, which
would have a net negative impact on all constituents within these
organizations, because the capacity to generate wealth would be
sacrificed in a blind attempt to achieve fairness. 232 From this
perspective, by producing wealth, managers are most responsible to
society. 233
As mentioned, Easterbrook and Fischel suggested that using
regulations, other than corporate law, to cultivate markets that better
deal with price uncertaintieS234 would be the best way to circumscribe
corporate for-profit activities without undermining the corporation as an
economizing device. 235 For instance, if a regulator wants to prevent a
corporation from releasing pollutants into a river, it should not change
corporate function through reforming corporate law; rather, it should
create a regulatory mechanism within the Environmental Protection
Act for monitoring and fining potential river polluters. If the
enforcement mechanism is sound, then no rational market actor will
229. See A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049
(1931) [hereinafter Berle, Corporate Powers]; E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are
CorporateManagers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REV. 1145 (1932); A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom
CorporateManagers are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REv. 1365 (1932) [hereinafter Berle,
A Note].
230. EASTERBROOK & FIsCHEL, supranote 147, at 38.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See id. at 35-38.
234. For an understanding of the relationship between the price mechanism and
uncertainty, consider the case of "transfer pricing," which is an accounting term for the
transfer of goods or services from one division or company (within the same group) to
another in order to distribute revenue in a more efficient manner. See Joshua Ronen &
Kashi R. Balachandran, An Approach to Transfer Pricing Under Uncertainty, 26 J. AccT.
RES. 300, 301-02 (1988).
235. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 147, at 37-39.
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attempt to violate this law because the potential risk grossly outweighs
the potential profit. In other words, if regulators understand that
corporate actors will violate the law if it is profitable to do so, then
regulators can create the appropriate regulatory incentives to
manipulate corporate behavior.
In this way, Easterbrook and Fischel reframed the corporate (social)
responsibility debate in U.S. corporate legal scholarship. The corporate
social responsibility of the Berle-Dodd debate shifted to a corporate
responsibility debate in mainstream corporate legal scholarship.
Shareholders were no longer characterized as proxies of the public
interest, as Berle suggested, 236 but as investors. 237 Directors were no
longer characterized as stewards of society, as Dodd suggested, 238 but as
champions of investors as a class. 239 As a result, the corporation is
understood as a tool, which best serves society when it solely focuses on
profitmaking, creating the wealth necessary to allow other segments of
society to cope with the world's problems.
F. Conclusion
As this section demonstrates, from the corporate legal perspective
today, corporations are neither expected nor encouraged to be imbued
with public spiritedness. They are profitmaking organizations that are
encouraged to act in a self-interested manner. There are a number of
interconnected assumptions that legitimate this perspective. First, the
corporation can best serve society by being an efficient wealth creation
device. 240 Second, direct legal intervention in corporate governance
undermines the efficiency of corporate wealth creation. 241 Third, if
managers serve one master-shareholders-then markets can police
corporate managers and preserve the efficiency of corporate wealth

236. See Fenner L. Stewart, Berle's Conception of Shareholder Primacy: A Forgotten
Perspective for Reconsideration During the Rise of Finance, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1457,
1458-59 (2011). But see Berle, CorporatePowers, supranote 229; Berle, A Note, supranote
229.
237. See id. But see, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reply: Letting ShareholdersSet the Rules,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1784 (2006) (arguing for increased shareholder power to change the
rules of internal corporate governance); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005) (arguing that increasing shareholder
power would improve corporate governance and enhance shareholder value).
238. See Dodd, supranote 229, at 1153-54.
239. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006) (responding to Bebchuk's arguments for
increased shareholder power over internal corporate governance).
240. See supra notes 230-27 and accompanying text.
241. See EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 147, at 38.
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creation. 242 Fourth, corporate law must therefore enforce shareholder
interests within corporate governance. 243 Fifth, corporate law must then
almost exclusively engage in agency issues between shareholders and
management. 244 Sixth, if regulators want to circumscribe the
profitmaking function of corporations, then areas of law other than
corporate law must be employed to change the price of doing business
that corporations face. 245 As a result, most corporate legal scholars view
corporate law as legitimate when it serves as a conservative mechanism
to avoid public interference and regulatory reform.
This conservative corporate law perspective is the dominant
mindset of U.S. corporate legal culture. Although there are always
dissenting opinions, this is the commonsense position in the business
world. Regulators would face serious resistance if they attempted to
experiment with corporate law in ways that might compromise the
corporation as an economizing device. 246
So, what about new governance's hope of "publicization of the
private?" Its legitimacy has not been established. Moreover, it appears
clear that publicization stands in the face of what is deemed to be the
commonsense position within corporate governance thinking.
III. THE NARRATIVE OF ENTRENCHED PRIVATIZATION

From a different perspective than what was outlined in the last
section, this section reconnects to the idea of technocratic narratives,
and suggests that governance narratives possess an additional quality
that tends to discourage publicization. This quality is a lack of
humanistic narratives, which can divorce decisionmaking from what is
at stake, namely the violent consequences of that particular decision on
a segment of society. 247
To explain this quality, this article draws a distinction between two
types of narratives: humanistic narratives and technocratic narratives.
This article defines humanistic narratives as storylines with identifiable
characters and a time sequence, which reveal the causes and
consequences of characters' actions. Humanistic narratives grant the
readers/listeners a digestible message that mirrors life experience. On
the other side of the distinction are technocratic narratives, which this
article defines as accounts used by technical experts and professionals
See
See
See
See
See
247. See
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

supranotes 230-39 and accompanying text.
Berle, A Note, supra note 229, at 1365.
supranotes 230-35 and accompanying text.
supranotes 234-35 and accompanying text.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 147, at 35-39.
Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
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who seek to employ a spectrum of scientific methodologies, but most
predominately economic ones, in an attempt to resolve governance
issues.
Mae Kuykendall, in her article about the lack of strong narratives in
corporate governance, chooses to label technocratic narratives as
"disourses" and humanistic narratives as just narratives. 248 She argues
that corporate law lacks the sort of narratives "that attract human
interest," even though the corporation is a significant site of "human
activity."249 Accordingly, although one might expect humanistic
narratives, they are rarely present or employed within corporate
governance. Kuykendall further notes that technocratic narratives in
corporate governance generally rely on economic analysis of corporate
interactions, which has the sanitizing effect of obscuring the social costs
of particular choices. 250 David Westbrook agrees, 251 adding that such
lack of humanistic narratives fails to provide corporate governance with
heroes that inspire virtue. 252
One can clearly appreciate that this lack of humanistic narratives is
damaging to the hope of publicization. Yet, the situation may be even
more alarming when one takes into account the effects of technocratic
narratives on governance more broadly. For instance, Kerry Rittich
suggests that the problems identified by corporate scholars, such as
Kuykendall and Westbrook, might reach beyond corporate governance
to impact public administrative agencies as well. 253
By the twentieth century, enlightened modern thinkers were
painfully aware of the loss of normative certainty that accompanied
accepting Nietzsche's thesis that the understanding of good was
historically contingent. 254 Without normative certainty, decisionmakers
grasped for the scientific method, which promised to reveal the "real
issues at stake" by providing social facts on which sound regulatory
frameworks could be constructed. 255 This legitimated decisionmaking
functions in a manner that mere power or politics could not. The

248. Mae Kuykendall, No Imagination: The Marginal Role of Narrative in Corporate
Law, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 537, 541 (2007).

249. Id.
250. See id. at 547-48, 589.
251. See Mae Kuykendall & David Westbrook, Introduction: Unsettling Questions,
DisquietingStories, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 817, 827-28.
252. See DAVID A. WESTBROOK, CITY OF GOLD: AN APOLOGY FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM IN
A TIME OF DISCONTENT 112 (2004).
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trans.,
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See generally Rittich, supra note 77.
See generally FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL (R. J. Hollingdale
reprt. ed. 1990).
Rittich, supranote 253, at 855.
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employment of social sciences by administrative agencies to solve social
problems in this manner has been called functionalism.
Reflecting on the work of John Willis, Rittich argues that
functionalism was successful in the New Deal era because it provided "a
way to depoliticize the process of adjudication and diffuse the conflicts
among the courts, the executive, and the legislature." 256 During the
interwar period in England, functionalists, such as Willis, defended the
expansion of the modern administrative state, which was striving to
meet the public's demands for greater state involvement in English
society. 257 As Martin Loughlin explains:
The functionalist style offered an alternative way of
addressing the issues that were presenting themselves
for resolution as matters of public law. It was therefore a
practical, reformist approach, offering solutions to a
variety of legal challenges facing modern government
and spanning the range from institutional reforms to
alternative modes of interpretation and methods of legal
reasoning. This practical program of law reform was
directly tied to the broader political movement
encompassed under the broad heads of new liberalism,
or democratic
progressivism,
democracy,
social
socialism. 258
The British functionalist movement paralleled that of American
Legal Realists, embracing governance by teams of experts, who could
259
use their mastery of science to determine what was best for society.
John Dewey rejected this expert paternalism, which subsequently
made his ideas unfashionable at the time, but he pressed on, insisting
that if a "government by experts" did not earnestly consult citizens, then
such government could amount to no more than "an oligarchy managed
in the interests of the few." 260 He insisted, "the enlightenment must
proceed in ways which force the administrative specialists to take

256. Id.
257. See Peter L. Lindseth, Reconciling with the Past: John Willis and the Question of
JudicialReview in Inter-War and Post-War England, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 657, 658 (2005).
258. Martin Loughlin, The FunctionalistStyle in Public Law, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 361,
362-63 (2005).
259. See generally Robert W. Gordon, Willis's American Counterparts: The Legal
Realists' Defence of Administration, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 405 (2005) (identifying
commonalities between American and British Legal Realists).
260. 2 JOHN DEWEY, The Public and Its Problems, in THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, at
235, 365 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1984).

CORPORATION, NEw GOVERNANCE, & PUBLICIZATION NARRATIvE

547

account of the needs [of the masses]. "261 But progressives, such as Willis,

believed such administrative expertise could determine what was best
for citizens, legitimating their authority in the modern world by paving
the path to progress with their technical knowledge.
Today, the technocratic mindset of functionalism remains the same;
however, as Rittich suggests, its use has changed, supporting the
conservative interests it once rivaled. 262 Rittich argues that regulators
now measure the performance of their institutions "by the extent to
which they further efficient transactions and encourage private-sector
activity." 263 She continues, "these objectives, in turn, are typically
understood to involve creating the legal infrastructure that furthers the
interests of investors and capital holders through, inter alia, enhanced
protection for property and contract rights."264 Rittich describes an
emerging power structure for governance in which "[c]adres of
technocrats and professionals . . . set the terms and conditions under

which states, markets, civil society groups, and individuals interact."265
This has led some to agree, in retrospect, that Dewey's rejection of
expert paternalism 266 may have deserved greater credence at the time.
The dangers of technocratic narratives have been clearly echoed by
other scholars. On the more radical end of the spectrum is David
Harvey. Harvey regards this problem of technocratic narratives as
reaching far beyond legal discourse. He views such narratives as part of
a conscious campaign over communication to create a "hegemonic
discourse," which is propagated through mass media-in particular, the
entertainment industry. 267 In Harvey's opinion, this hegemonic
discourse has already corrupted "ways of thought and political-economic
practices to the point where it is now part of the commonsense way we
interpret, live in, and understand the world." 268 Thus, from his Marxian
perspective, such narratives are powerful examples of how capitalists
have adapted and reasserted their ideology so as to once again lure the
proletariat into undermining their own interests. Harvey believes this
to be one of the central achievements of the neoliberal movement. 269
Like Harvey, Rittich suggests that ideology is corrupting
governance, using a scientific and technical language that appears
261. Id.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

See Rittich, supranote 253, at 855.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 856.
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David Harvey, Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction, 610 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL.
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depoliticized but, in fact, limits choices within the "regulatory calculus"
270
to those that embrace "efficiency, expertise, and cost-containment." In
this way, humanistic narratives are regarded as unsuitable and are
thus marginalized within decisionmaking. Rittich's argument
demonstrates how technocratic narratives depoliticize and dehumanize
social conflicts by divorcing them from the personal and necessarily
political humanistic narratives in the name of the scientific method.
What is dangerous about this dehumanization of narratives is that
social conflicts can be abstractified, practically concealing the
connection between particular choices and the violent consequences of
that particular course of action on a segment of society. Thomas Nagel
brings home this last point when he writes: "Once the door is opened to
calculations of utility .

.

. the usual speculations .

.

. can be brought to

bear to ease the consciences of those responsible for a certain number of
charred babies." 271
What the positions of Kuykendall, Harvey, and Rittich all have in
common is the lament over the underlying ideology that has presently
captured technocratic narratives. They each highlight, in different ways,
how technocratic narratives guide their users to prioritize economic
needs over social needs when it is necessary to choose between the two.
As Harvey pointed out, the normative message that economic needs
must always be the priority over all others presents itself as
commonsense, radicalizing any suggestion to the contrary. 272
Kuykendall's approach inspires meaningful discourse between
ideological adversaries, since it allows for a critical reflection on
particular communication without heightening the distinction between
such adversaries. One can imagine that approaching such a discourse
like an embattled proletariat would probably prove to be less than
successful. Kuykendall approaches sensitive issues with tact, so as not
to alienate a corporate legal audience, which usually tends to be
conservative. Consider Kuykendall's diplomacy in the following passage:
The absence of [humanistic] narrative from corporate
law is substantially explained by the nature of the
undertaking of producing wealth and by the social
formation of business. The absence of [such] narrative is
not a nefarious scheme to undermine critique, although
it tends to have that effect. Rather, the underlying

270. Rittich, supranote 253, at 867.
271. THOMAs NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONs 59 (1979).
272. See Harvey, supra note 267, at 22-23.
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project of generating wealth does not produce rich
human stories. 273
Kuykendall's approach does not point fingers at capitalists and the
cadres of technocrats whom Harvey would suggest are operating behind
the scenes to control societies. As a result, the chance of constructive
bipartisan debate, as well as the potential emancipation from a
particular mindset, becomes more likely, since criticism can be deftly
directed at a normative level rather than a more personal one. In fact,
her article sparked broad debate in the corporate legal community,
resulting in a symposium at Michigan State University College of Law
entitled the Business Law and NarrativeSymposium. 274
In conclusion, the problem of a lack of humanistic narrative appears
not to be isolated to private governance (corporate governance), but also
appears to seriously threaten public governance (administrative
agencies) as well. Again, publicization suggests that there will be the
"percolation" of values from public governance to private governance. 275
So, if this percolation process transports values from public to private,
what happens when there needs to be a publicization of the public as
well? In other words, what if privatization has been so invasive within
governance that public governance no longer imbues Braithwaite's
"public law values"? Or, what if it never did? The above account
suggests that this might be the case. And if this is the case, then the
project of new governance might be even more dangerously optimistic
than this article suggests.
CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to dash the hopes of those who quell their
fear of privatization with the faith that the clouds shall part and
corporate doves imbued with the twin virtues of benevolent kindness
and efficiency shall save us all from the woes of modern governance.
Based on the literatures reviewed, there is little merit in hoping that
this will occur. The blurring of public and private in governance today
will not lead to the publicization of corporations in some spontaneous
way-to think otherwise amounts to magical thinking.
That said, magical thinking has an important role in the cultivation
of ideology. Those that champion privatization have the "foundation
273. Kuykendall, supranote 248, at 555.
274. Press Release, Mich. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Michigan State Law Review to Host
Business Law and Narrative Symposium
(Sept. 10,
2009), available at
http://www.law.msu.edu/news/2009/releases/business-narrative.html.
275. Braithwaite, supra note 7, at 4.
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myth" of the medieval lex mercatoria276-the promise of a pure free
market that can shepherd a commoditized humanity through the
wonders of the price mechanism. 277 If this is so, then does the myth of
publicization create an appropriate counterview of social order,
adequately challenging the vision of a pure free market and legitimating
opposition to it? A better myth is possible.
There needs to be more emphasis on social justice, 278 equality, 279
and the socioeconomic impacts of privatization. 280 Maybe there needs to
be a louder campaign that stresses an understanding of privatization
through the lens of human rights, 281 which asserts that international
customary law obliges 282 governments to ensure that each of their

276. For more on how such "foundation myths" function, see Nicholas H.D. Foster,
Foundation Myth as Legal Formant: The Medieval Law Merchant and the New Lex
Mercatoria, FORUM HISTORIAE JURIS (Mar. 18, 2005), http://www.forhistiur.del
zitat/0503foster.htm. See also Michaels, supranote 163, at 264-65, 267.
277. See, e.g., Hayek, supra note 16, at 528 (arguing that a planned economy could never
match the efficiency of the free market).
278. See, e.g., Demetrius S. Iatridis, The Social Justice and Equality Contexts of
Privatization, in SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE WELFARE STATE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPE: THE IMPACT OF PRIVATIZATION 3 (Demetrius S. Iatridis ed., 2000) (describing the

negative social impacts of privatization in Central and Eastern European countries).
279. See, e.g., id. at 18.
280. See, e.g., Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, Water Privatisation and Socio-Economic
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281. See, e.g., CAPITALIST PUNISHMENT:

PRISON PRIVATIZATION

& HUMAN RIGHTS

(Andrew Coyle et al. eds., 2003); WILLIAM F. FELICE, THE GLOBAL NEW DEAL: ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN WORLD POLITICS (2003); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization,

Prisons, Democracy, and Human Rights: The Need to Extend the Province of
Administrative Law, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 511 (2005); Alana Klein, Judging as
Nudging: New Governance Approaches for the Enforcement of Constitutional Social and
Economic Rights, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 351 (2008); Laurence J. Kotlikoff et al.,
PrivatizingSocial Security in the United States-Comparing the Options, 2 REV. ECON.
DYNAMICS 532 (1999).

282. Although some argue that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "is not
binding," they argue that "most of its rights have been incorporated into the domestic legal
systems of most countries[,] . . . especially . . . the rights in the Declaration's first 'column'

[namely civil and political rights]." Mary Ann Glendon, The Rule of Law in the Universal
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citizens has the right to dignity, an adequate standard of living,
housing, social services, and education. 283 Maybe there also needs to be
further declarations that these rights are binding on all nationS284 and,
thus, are "not negotiable"! 285 Of course, this is only one of many options,
which could coordinate and galvanize the fragmentation of social
reaction that Polanyi predicted in his theory of the double movement. 286
That said, human rights framing may also be inadequate. In the
face of how countries observe human rights, 287 the hope that states will
meet these human rights obligations (in particular social, cultural, and
economic rights) 288 is probably as close to becoming reality as a
reincarnation of the medieval lex mercatoria.289 Yet, this human rights
framing of the privatization issue provides a stronger "foundation myth"
than publicization and a better counter to the present spin of the freemarketeers. Either way, there is more work to be done in Nietzsche's
Dark Workshop.
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